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Tracing the Circle of Truth:




IS Buddhism a philosophy, a religion, both, or neither? Although this is a question that we usually avoid because of its unwieldy scope, it was an 
important problem for Meiji-period Buddhists. In their attempts to tackle this 
question, Meiji Buddhists and philosophers also reinterpreted the meaning of 
Buddhism, philosophy and religion. One of the most interesting and prolific 
thinkers that addressed these rather large issues was Inoue Enryo #±FHT 
(1858-1919).1
1 For an overview of Inoue’s life and intellectual activities in English, see Staggs 1983.
Although he is now largely forgotten, he was very well known in the Meiji 
period. He was a best-selling author who published on a wide range of top­
ics such as philosophy, Buddhism, psychology, nationalism, the study of 
supernatural beings and educational philosophy. He was equally active in the 
application and realization of his theoretical endeavors. He founded the 
Tetsugakkan a private institute of philosophy, which later became
Toyo University Inoue was also known for his yokai gaku
detailed studies on ghosts and supernatural phenomena, which were aimed at 
proving their non-existence. His numerous lectures on this topic earned him 
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the nickname Yokai hakase ^’SW±, “Doctor Ghost.”2 Inoue was also a core 
member of the nationalist organization Seikyo-sha ft Witt, a group of intel­
lectuals who opposed overreaching Westernization and sought to define and 
preserve Japan’s national essence or kokusui US. The multidimensionality 
of Inoue provides us with a unique point of view on a rapidly changing Japan.
2 For the context and a study of Inoue’s ghost studies, see Figal 1999.
3 For the development of the concept of religion in Meiji Japan, see Isomae 2003.
He was bom in 1858 in Echigo (Niigata prefecture), the eldest son of 
a Buddhist priest affiliated with the Otani branch (Higashi Honganji
of the Jodo Shin denomination Because this position was
hereditary, Inoue was ordained into this denomination and was expected to 
succeed to his father’s position. In 1878, Inoue was selected to study in Tokyo 
with a scholarship from Higashi Honganji. As a student at Tokyo Imperial 
University, he studied Western philosophy with Ernest F. Fenollosa 
(1853-1908), who made a lasting impression on him. Inoue was the first grad­
uate of this university who had specialized in philosophy. Upon graduation 
in 1885, he was offered positions in the government as well as in the Higashi 
Honganji organization. He refused both, just as he would continue to refuse 
official positions throughout his life. Since the Jodo Shin denomination had 
sponsored his studies, he was expected to become a teacher within the orga­
nization in return, but he declined such a career. Inoue was diplomatic enough 
to be able to go his own way without openly clashing with the denominational 
authorities. Even though he was one of the modernizers of Buddhism, he 
avoided a close relationship with this Buddhist denomination.
The introduction of Western philosophy and science in the late Edo and 
Meiji periods led to enormous intellectual changes in Japan. Buddhism was 
under immense social and political pressure and questions of how to charac­
terize it became a significant problem for Buddhists. It could no longer 
describe itself without reference to the new Western categories of “philoso­
phy,” “religion” and “science.” Although Buddhism is now generally regard­
ed as a religion, for Meiji Buddhists and philosophers this was not 
self-evident, because the word “religion” was closely associated with 
Christianity in this period.3 Further, the term, tetsugaku was usually 
reserved for Western philosophy. A number of contemporary Buddhists and 
other intellectuals chose “philosophy” as a more appropriate characterization. 
Buddhist thinkers also had to make sense of the contradictions between 
Buddhism and these Western ideas. This intellectual stress can be compared
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with that which medieval Christian philosophers must have felt in their 
attempt to reconcile Christian dogma with the newly translated works of 
Aristotle. Both “religion” and “philosophy” were new categories that posed 
real interpretative problems for Meiji Buddhists. Inoue tried to solve these 
problems by interpreting Buddhism as a modem philosophy. In this process, 
he redefined both Buddhism and philosophy, which makes him a philosopher 
in his own right, and not simply a Buddhist apologist. As such, the role of 
Western philosophy in Inoue (and others) was not, as has often been argued, 
simply a rhetorical strategy.
Inoue’s choice of the phrase “Buddhist philosophy” indicates that he was 
both a Buddhist and a practitioner of Western philosophy. The connection 
between his writings on Western philosophy and Buddhism has not been 
given sufficient attention in the relevant literature. Further, the attempt to 
interpret his thought solely through his book, Bukkvo katsuron joron (ASS 
(An Introduction to the Revitalization of Buddhism), has led to eval­
uations of his work, such as “eclectic,” which are reductionist in that they 
gloss over the specific interpretative problems Buddhist thinkers in the Meiji 
era faced. For example, Judith Snodgrass has devoted one chapter to Inoue in 
her book on the Columbian exposition and the international context of Meiji 
Buddhist discourse, in which she observes that, “nowhere does he give an 
explanation of any Western philosophy,” and argues that his use of Western 
philosophy is best understood as a deployment of Western authority.4 In the 
following, I will show that Inoue’s use of philosophy and his answers to con­
temporary problems were more complex than has been acknowledged in this 
and other studies.
4 Snodgrass 2003, pp. 147, 154.
In this article, I will first address some of the problems faced by Buddhism 
in the Meiji period and consider how Inoue tried to overcome them through 
the combination of Western philosophy and Buddhism. In order to blend these 
two traditions, he needed to address the development of both. I will describe 
his interpretation of these histories and point out some problems in this ac­
count. In the conclusion, I will discuss the function of his interpretation of the 
history of Buddhism in his project to revitalize Buddhism, and attempt to 
explain what this means for our understanding of Inoue in general.
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The Challenge of Revitalizing Buddhism
Inoue’s project of revitalizing Buddhism must be seen against the background 
of the persecution of Buddhism and the subsequent reform movements in the 
Meiji period.5 Even before the Meiji Restoration, Buddhism had become 
highly unpopular among the intellectual elite, especially within nativist cir­
cles. The Meiji revolution brought these nativist scholars to political promi­
nence and gave them a brief, but significant, chance to make anti-Buddhist 
policies a central aspect in the new government’s attempt to restructure the 
social order. Shinto and Buddhism had coexisted more or less as a doctrinal 
and institutional unity, but were now forcibly separated. Shinto myths were 
used as the central justifying ideology of the emperor-system. At the same 
time, Buddhism was persecuted and suddenly lost its former position in the 
Japanese political order.
5 Buddhism in the Meiji period has not been researched as extensively as other periods of 
Japanese Buddhism. For the persecution of, and the changes in, Buddhism in that period, in 
English, see Ketelaar 1990, and Colcutt 1986.
Gradually, Buddhists came to realize that a return to the past was impos­
sible and that Buddhism had to redefine itself in order to find a place in a 
rapidly modernizing society. Inoue was one of the progressive Buddhists in 
the Meiji era who responded to the threat that Buddhism faced and tried to 
redefine it and its social position.
To understand the difficulty of the task of revitalizing Buddhism, one needs 
to look at the criticisms that it faced. Anti-Buddhist thought and propaganda 
took many forms and reached the very foundations of Buddhism. First of all, 
Buddhism’s foreign origin became problematic in this period of national uni­
fication. In the creation of a national ideology, centered around the emperor 
and justified by nativist myths, this foreign religion was interpreted as an 
anomaly in Japanese society.
Secondly, Buddhism was said to be socially and economically deficient, 
decadent and wasteful. There was much rivalry among the different Buddhist 
denominations, which was seen as a sign of the self-centeredness of the 
Buddhist clergy. A decadent and profligate Buddhist church was attacked as 
contributing nothing to the strengthening of the nation. Also, because Bud­
dhism had enjoyed a privileged status and a significant role in the recently 
overthrown Tokugawa political system, it was discredited as an “evil of the 
past,” and an impediment to modernization.
Further, Buddhism was said to be no longer a credible explanation of the
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world. During the eighteenth century, Japan’s intellectual climate began to 
change, in part because of the importation of Western science and philoso­
phy. Western science, medicine and technology came to replace classical 
Chinese science and philosophy as the prime source of knowledge. In this 
process, the credibility of Buddhism suffered greatly. In particular, Buddhist 
religious cosmology could not be defended as a credible alternative to West­
ern science.
Buddhism’s own history also came to be used as a critique against it. 
Mahayana Buddhism was treated by European Buddhologists and influential 
Japanese writers, most notably Tominaga Nakamoto Wzkfflt (1715-1746), 
as a deviation from “original Buddhism,” or Buddhism as taught by the 
Buddha. Consequently Japanese Buddhism, which is of the Mahayana 
variety, was seen, if it was accepted as Buddhism at all, as inauthentic. The 
“theory that Mahayana is not the Buddha’s teachings” (daijo hibussetsu ron 
m) became a major theoretical and doctrinal problem for Meiji-era 
Buddhists.
Finally, Christianity, which had been forbidden and persecuted in Japan 
since the seventeenth century, reappeared in force after the conclusion of the 
treaties with the Western powers. Although not the greatest source of criti­
cism of Buddhism, Christianity was perceived by Buddhists as their worst 
enemy.6
6 For the relation between Buddhism and Christianity in the Meiji period, see Thelle 1987.
Inoue tried to overcome these criticisms by interpreting Buddhism as a 
modem philosophy that was essential for the Japanese nation. Before we look 
at his solution to the problems faced by Buddhism, we must realize the soci­
ological import of defining it as a “philosophy.” Although in English it is now 
common to speak of “Buddhist philosophy,” the term, “philosophy” (tetsu- 
gaku), was at that time a new concept for Japanese. Tetsugaku was one of the 
many neologisms in a time of large-scale copying from the West. In fact, 
Inoue used a whole range of Western vocabulary such as “evolution,” “sci­
ence,” “absolute truth,” and “nation,” which must have made his writings 
appear modem and new for contemporary readers. On a larger scale, the im­
portation, translation and use of these concepts were central aspects of the 
modernization of Japanese society.
Philosophy was basically a new discipline for the Japanese. The first mod­
em (i.e., Western-style) Japanese philosophers, most notably Nishi Amane B 
(1829-1897), faced the immense task of translating and introducing a
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whole new field of study. It is less well known that Japanese intellectuals at 
the time faced the problem of how to match the new concepts of philosophy 
and religion with their native traditions of thought. There was disagreement 
over whether or not Buddhism and Confucianism were in fact a “philosophy” 
and also over the question of whether or not they possessed a “philosophy.”7 
Nishi and Nakae Chomin were both of the opinion that Japan had
7 See Ikeda 2001.
8 The difference between the Japanese and the Chinese case is remarkable. In the 1920s, 
Chinese philosophers, most notably Feng You-lan claimed that Chinese thought, includ­
ing Buddhism, was philosophy (zhe xue, the Chinese pronunciation of the borrowed word tet- 
sugakti).
9 This voluminous work was published in several parts. Bukkyo katsuron joron (An Intro­
duction to the Revitalization of Buddhism), published in 1887, became a national best-seller.
never produced any philosophy. However, some philosophers like Tanaka 
Odo HTTHt (1867-1932), Torio Koyata (1847-1905), Inoue
Tetsujiro (1855-1944) and Inoue Enryo maintained that Buddhism
and Confucianism either possessed or were a “philosophy.” Ultimately, these 
interpretations did not succeed. In modem Japanese, Buddhist theory is 
referred to as “Buddhist thought” (bukkyo shisd U77JSU), and not as 
“Buddhist philosophy” (bukkyo tetsugaku JA^S^) as Inoue and others pro­
posed.8 9The point here is not that the self-presentation of Buddhism as a “phi­
losophy” is anachronistic, but rather that Westernization and modernization 
resulted in a number of changes in the self-understanding and self-represen­
tation of Buddhism. While in previous eras, Buddhists had understood and 
represented their teachings and practices in terms of different denominations 
or in comparison with, for example, “Confucianism” (which is also a very 
problematic construct), in the Meiji period much of Buddhism’s self-percep­
tion and self-representation was conducted in, or mediated by, Western dis­
tinctions and categories. This problem of the self-definition of Buddhism 
vis-a-vis Western categories of philosophy and religion in this period has 
scarcely been researched. Inoue Enryo is important because he was one of the 
most active and explicit contemporary thinkers who attempted to find a solu­
tion for this problem. His texts are significant in that they deal explicitly with 
this problem of the self-description of Buddhism.
Inoue himself was well aware of and indeed emphasized the fact that this 
interpretation of Buddhism as a modem philosophy was new. For example, 
in his most important work, Bukkyo katsuron (The Revitalization of
Buddhism)? he writes that he wants to “separate the philosophical parts and 
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the religious parts that exist in Buddhism, and group, according to [these] cat­
egories, all the elements of the two that are found in the sutras and explana­
tory texts, then generalize this and formulate a coherent line of reason.”10 The 
previously undifferentiated Buddhism was to be taken apart and rebuilt 
according to new categories.
Inoue interpreted Buddhism as “a religion based on philosophy,” but his 
writings on Buddhism are almost exclusively concerned with philosophy. We 
will look in more detail at the content of this philosophy later. What needs to 
be stressed is firstly, that this interpretation was a new and modern catego­
rization of Buddhism, and that this new interpretation was meant to overcome 
the criticisms by anti-Buddhist thinkers. Both were parts of the “revitaliza­
tion” of Buddhism, i.e., Inoue’s attempt to pull it out of its crisis.
In retrospect, we can distinguish three theoretical stages or layers in the 
attempt by Inoue to prove Buddhism’s intellectual value. In the first phase, 
he denies the philosophical and scientific value11 of Christianity. Its growing 
popularity among the intellectual elite was a major headache for Meiji Bud­
dhists. Inoue was troubled by the thought of Christianity spreading widely 
throughout Japan. Indeed, he devoted whole books, along with the first half 
of his magnum opus, Bukkyd katsuron, to its refutation. Inoue turned the crit­
icism leveled against Buddhism, that it is not a valid explanation of the world, 
against Christianity. Apart from the plethora of contradictions and absurdi­
ties Inoue discerned in Christianity, he particularly emphasized that the 
Christian doctrine of creation was incompatible with the modem scientific 
principles of the conservation of energy, the indestructibility of matter and 
the law of cause and effect.
In the second phase, Inoue argues that Buddhism, in contrast to Christi­
anity, accords with modem science and philosophy. The way that he tried to 
prove how they were in accordance with each other will be described in the
The main body of the work consists of two parts. Bukkyd katsuron honron dai ippen: haja ka­
tsuron ® JlhSiw (The Revitalization of Buddhism Part One: Refuting
False Doctrines) and Kensho katsuron SHjEjgfm (Part Two: Bringing out the Truth), are a refu­
tation of Christianity, and a new philosophical interpretation of Buddhism, respectively. What 
was originally meant to be the third part appeared as a separate book in 1912, under the title 
Katsu bukkyd (Living Buddhism).
10 Inoue 1990a, p. 222.
11 Note that Inoue, like most other Meiji intellectuals, made some sort of distinction between 
philosophy and science, but saw both of them as belonging to one whole, and ascribed the same 
authority to both. Inoue saw philosophy as the unifying science, or the study of the principles 
which underlie those of all particular sciences.
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next section. As for science, he compared the law of causality in Buddhism 
with that of cause and effect in science. Furthermore, Buddhism, unlike 
Christianity, assumes that the world has always existed and will do so for­
ever. 12 Therefore, it is in keeping with the principle of the indestructibility of 
matter.
12 In later writings, most notably Against Materialism (1898), Inoue used this argument to 
criticize the shortcomings of the evolutionary theory.
13 Inoue 1990a, p. 251.
14 Inoue 1987b.
However, one could argue that, if Buddhism is of equal value as Western 
philosophy and science, Japan should continue to import the latter and dis­
card Buddhism. In the third phase, Inoue argues that Buddhism has an extra 
value in comparison to Western philosophy and science. According to him, 
Buddhism is the only successful combination of philosophy and religion. As 
a philosophy, it is based on universal truth. As a religion, Buddhism shows 
the way in which individuals can reach that truth in enlightenment. Thus Bud­
dhism is the application (oyo of philosophy. In other words, Buddhism 
satisfies both intellectual and emotional cravings. Inoue contrasts this with 
Western philosophy and religion. “Western scholars of today have searched 
for and tried to organize this application, but as yet have been unable to do 
so. We can see that it has existed in the East for already three thousand 
years!”13 We can interpret Inoue’s criticism in the following way. Regarding 
Christianity, there have been attempts to prove its philosophical value, but 
they are unconvincing because Christianity’s origins are not in philosophy. 
Christianity is based on revelation. Regarding Western philosophy, it always 
remained an intellectual insight and never succeeded in becoming a religion. 
In sum, Inoue argues for the supremacy of Buddhism by negating the philo­
sophical value of Christianity and the religious value of Western philosophy.
II. History of Philosophy and Buddhism
Inoue’s interpretation of Buddhism as a philosophy is also a theory of the his­
tory of philosophy and that of Buddhism. This theme will be presented here 
mainly by considering two books that contain the core of his philosophical 
thought. Both were written around the same time. The first is Tetsugakiiydrvd 
(The Essentials of Philosophy), written between 1886 and 1888.14 
The second book is his magnum opus, Bukkyd katsuron. One of the main 
points here is that Inoue’s works on philosophy and Buddhism are closely
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related. Previous studies have not discussed the intimate connection between 
his philosophical texts and his Buddhist writings, despite the fact that it is the 
single most distinctive characteristic of his theory-construction. In the fol­
lowing section, we will look in detail at how Tetsugakuydryd lays the philo­
sophical basis for Bukkyd katsuron. The reader of the latter was assumed to 
be familiar with the philosophical themes explored in the former.
History of Philosophy
In Tetsugaku ydryd, Inoue describes the development of philosophy, East and 
West. The first part gives a general introduction to the field of philosophy and 
what he calls the “external development of philosophy” (tetsugaku gaibu no 
hatten TtTTI-SKOT ): a history of the different schools and philosophers in 
different countries. The second part describes the “inner,” logical develop­
ment of philosophy.
(1) External Development of Philosophy
Inoue divides Eastern philosophy into Chinese and Indian philosophy. West­
ern philosophy is divided in terms of time into ancient Greek and modem phi­
losophy.15 Although this history of philosophy was meant as an introduction 
to philosophy, and appears to us now to be essentially a text book, it also 
reveals Inoue’s ideas of the development and history of philosophy.
15 Philosophy of the Roman era and the Middle Ages is excluded because it was regarded 
as the “dark age,” where philosophy declined because of Christianity. See Inoue 1987b, p. 128.
The first point of significance is his claim that there is something like “East­
ern philosophy” at all. As noted above, this was a new category in Japan, and 
it was an active, interpretative choice to classify various Asian systems of 
thought under the foreign category of “philosophy.” Inoue writes that, around 
the same time, several different theories started competing with each other in 
Greece, India and China, thereby giving rise to abstract thought and philoso­
phy. This line of thought is similar to what Karl Jaspers later presented as the 
theory of the axial age, with the difference being that Inoue did not give much 
significance to the rise of Judaic thought. Also, Inoue, as a nationalist, was 
concerned with the demise of Japanese (and also Asian) culture, religion and 
thought. His claim that Eastern philosophy exists was meant as a wake-up call 
for Japanese who were too Western-minded and had discarded their own tra­
ditions, as well as a critique of a Eurocentric account of philosophy. Inoue 
writes the following in the preface to Tetsugaku ydryd'.
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Inoue Tetsujiro has already published his lectures on philosophy. 
But that book is only a summary of Greek philosophy and does not 
deal with modem Western philosophy or with Eastern philosophy. 
Therefore, by reading that book, one comes only to know one part 
of philosophy, one cannot avoid the regrettable fact that one does 
not know the whole. My book is not like that. [I will] write down 
in order and compare the philosophy of old and new, East and West. 
I believe that the reader will come to know the grand outline of the 
whole system of philosophy without difficulties.16
16 Inoue 1987b, p. 87.
17 Ibid., p. 125.
18 See the reprint of Inoue’s English notes on Western philosophy in Saito 1988, p. 202.
In short, we can say that Inoue Enryo tried to globalize the history of philos­
ophy. While doing so, he made some of the first steps in comparative philos­
ophy.
The second point of importance is that the book familiarizes the reader with 
the concept of the “development” of thought. The idea of development was 
also relatively new in Japan. Theories of evolution were introduced by for­
eign teachers like Fenollosa and Japanese thinkers like Kato Hiroyuki WW5A 
± (1836-1916), both teachers of Inoue. Theories of evolution, in particular 
the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, became a major influence on 
Japanese intellectual life.
Inoue applies evolutionary theory to the development of philosophy. In his 
view, to understand philosophy properly, one must grasp the “laws of the 
development of thought.” Inoue states that philosophy is a living entity, and 
as such is subject to many of the same laws that govern living organisms. To 
begin with, philosophy is organized as an organic structure. He states: “The 
development of thought is the same as that of an organic body, with different 
sorts of elements together making up a new component, and when compo­
nents come together, they form a new structure.”17 The relationship between 
philosophy and society is also explained in organic terms. Attaching great 
importance to philosophy, Inoue compares it to the nervous system of the 
greater organism of society. One cannot develop without the other, and phi­
losophy is the “internal spirit” that animates society.18 Philosophy is strong­
ly influenced by its social and political environment and has to adapt itself to 
society in order to survive. Furthermore, philosophy thrives when its elements 
compete and struggle with each other. Inoue states that the comprehension 
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among many schools and theories partly explains why philosophy flourished 
in Greece, India and China. He also argues that it explains the contemporary 
decline of philosophy in Asia:
[A]fter the Middle Ages, new theories perished or just did not arise. 
This is mainly because studies of ancient times that once flourished, 
had a force that almost overwhelmed society. They lasted for hun­
dreds and thousands of years, so that new good theories challeng­
ing this [situation] could not arise. Therefore, human understanding 
submerged deeper into old practices. Thought, in the end, became 
banal, and this has caused today’s decline.19
19 Inoue 1987b, pp. 95-96.
20 See also Inoue 1987a.
21 Saito 1988, p. 191.
Inoue combines this organic notion of development (evolutionary theory) 
with a logical development of philosophy (the dialectics of Hegel). Philoso­
phy is organically built up of small parts forming structures, and this happens 
according to Hegel’s dialectic: the law of thesis, antithesis and the union of 
both in a synthesis, which in turn is challenged by an antithesis, and so on. 
According to Inoue, all philosophy is subject to this law, and he interprets the 
history of philosophy of both East and West according to this principle. An 
important consequence of this idea of development is that the earlier stages 
of philosophical development are not discarded, but are retained in the grand 
structure of philosophy.20 The later stages are more developed and express a 
better understanding of reality, but are still continuations of the earlier expla­
nations. In his English notes on philosophy, he predicts that Chinese philos­
ophy will rise again if its harmony is disrupted by the confrontation and 
combination of indigenous philosophy with elements of Western philosophy. 
On a larger scale, he writes that we can expect “a more complete philosophy” 
if a synthesis is made between Asian and Western philosophy. With this asser­
tion, Inoue is, in fact, announcing his own intentions to synthesize Eastern 
and Western philosophy.21
(2) Internal Development of Philosophy
The second part of Tetsugaku ydryd describes the “inner organization of pure 
philosophy.” It presents his interpretation of an “inner logical development 
of philosophy” which we can see “if we proceed from the initial steps of phi-
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losophy to its profound meaning.”22 For Inoue, “pure philosophy” (junsei 
tetsugaku means the study of what he sees as the most fundamen­
tal problem of philosophy: mind and matter. It is an analysis of how they come 
into existence and the relation between them. This problem is central to 
Inoue’s own philosophy, though his usage of the terms is not clear-cut. Matter 
and mind carry several meanings in his writings. He also occasionally switch­
es between them. However, his distinction basically refers to that of the 
subject and the outside world. His philosophy can, in this sense, be traced to 
the legacy of Kant, who maintained that reality, as we know it, is constructed 
by the categories as well as by the object of perception, which would remain 
“blind” without these categories. The result is that we cannot know if reality 
as we know it actually corresponds to reality in the outside world, or “das 
Ding an sick.” Thus Kant concluded that it therefore remains unknowable.
Fichte criticized Kant for assuming, and thereby “knowing,” the existence 
of something unknowable. He eliminated the “Ding an sich” and turned 
Kant’s philosophy into idealism. This was the beginning of German idealism, 
which heavily influenced Inoue. Echoing Kant, Inoue also discusses the 
knowable/unknowable distinction. His philosophy of mind and matter can be 
characterized as an attempt to overcome the distinction between subject and 
unknowable object. This philosophy was also a reaction against positivist and 
especially materialist philosophy which had found its way to Japan. In this 
sense, matter and mind in Inoue’s philosophy signify the building blocks of 
the universe. He somehow combines these two meanings in his own philos­
ophy.
To return to the development of philosophy, he argues that the inner devel­
opment of pure philosophy consists of several stages. Each stage is a differ­
ent position on the problem of matter and mind. According to Inoue, the stages 
proceed from one to the next according to the laws of logic. This develop­
ment consists of seven stages, and the primary progression is the dialectical 
movement from materialism to idealism and, finally, the synthesis of the two 
in his philosophy. The order of this development proceeds as follows:
1. Dualism of matter and mind (busshin nigenron WE—7tt«), or the posi­
tion that mind and matter differ in substance (busshin itairon
pfffj )•
2. Matter-only, no mind (yuibutsu mushinron or materialism
(yuibutsuron nfUMin).
22 Inoue 1987b, p. 150.
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3. Not matter, nor mind (hibutsu hishinron or rationalism
(yuiriron DtSiw).
4. No matter, no mind (mubutsu mushinron or nihilism
(kyomuron
5. Mind-only, no matter (yuishin mubutsuron or idealism
{yuishinron fltT'lm).
6. Matter and mind both exist (vushin yubutsuron fLL?A#Uifti).
7. Matter and mind share the same substance (busshin dotairon WCFTT 
nfffl J.
Let us begin with an overview of these stages of pure philosophy: The first 
is a pre-reflexive one, the “view of the common people,” where there is not 
yet a philosophical distinction between phenomenon and substance of matter 
and mind.23 Matter-only, or materialism, which he defines as the view that 
everything is made out of atoms and there is nothing like the mind, is the first 
philosophical stage. Inoue poses several objections to materialism, the most 
fundamental of which is that ultimately the atomic theory does not explain 
what matter actually is. Further, he argues that evolution cannot be explained 
without recourse to some power which drives it and a basic structure which 
must have been present from the beginning. Therefore, he states that the exis­
tence of an origin which cannot be reduced to matter must be accepted.
23 Ibid., p. 154.
This necessity brings one to the third stage, “not matter, nor mind,” which 
holds that all things come from an original substance which is neither matter 
nor mind. Inoue says this position is found in the philosophy of Anaximander, 
Pythagoras, and Spencer’s theory of the original power and the (Neo-) Con­
fucian idea of the Great Ultimate (taikyoku ±S). For Inoue, the problem with 
these theories is that this original beginning, which is neither matter nor mind, 
remains unknown. This way of reasoning does not bring us to the truth.
Inoue says that at this point one is forced to change the direction of the 
investigation toward the study of the mind. If we look at what we know of 
matter, one can see that it consists of form, touch, taste, sound and fragrance, 
but these are all qualities which are constructed by the senses, and together 
we give them the name of “matter.” However, we do not know what it is like 
outside the senses. We cannot tell if matter actually exists or if it has any sub­
stance outside the senses. Regarding “mind,” we only have the same phe­
nomena of the senses and of thinking, but thinking is actually nothing more 
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than a combination of sensations, and we do not know if there is a mind-sub- 
stance apart from this sense phenomena. At this fourth stage (no matter, no 
mind), it is therefore said that mind, like matter, is nothing more than sensa­
tions.
The phase of mind-only or idealism is reached when one realizes that the 
fourth position is untenable because it does not account for logic and the cat­
egories of time and space. The fourth theory (no matter, no mind) holds only 
itself to be true and therefore other theories to be untrue, so it at least affirms 
the principle of non-contradiction, that A and not-A cannot be true at the same 
time and in the same respect. In other words, it assumes logical rules. Further, 
for sensations to arise or to combine, space and time are necessary, both of 
which cannot arise from the sensations, themselves. They are elements of 
thinking, i.e., of mind. Therefore, the next step is necessarily the position 
which holds that only mind exists, idealism. Everything—mind, matter, logic, 
all distinctions—ultimately exists only for consciousness. The most extreme 
proponent of idealism is, according to Inoue, Fichte.
The sixth stage maintains that both matter and mind exist. The reason for 
this is that we do not know these two apart from each other. They have a rel­
ative, dependent existence with regard to each other. Therefore, both the the­
ories of mind-only and matter-only cannot be true. Mind and matter, both 
relative, must come into existence out of an absolute, which is neither mind 
nor matter. According to Inoue, this theory is free from the faults of idealism 
and materialism, but does not properly explain the relation between the ab­
solute vis-a-vis matter and mind.
This problem is, in turn, solved in the last stage, which is the theory that 
holds that matter and mind are phenomena that share the same substance. We 
will look at this theory in some detail, because according to Inoue this stage 
is the most perfect philosophy. First of all, in contrast to the previous posi­
tion, he maintains that the absolute cannot be outside of the relative for two 
reasons. The first is epistemological: If the absolute exists outside of the realm 
of relative phenomena (meaning matter and mind), it is unknowable. Since 
we know this absolute exists, it must be in the sphere of the relative. The sec­
ond is logical: We know what “absolute” is only in contrast to “relative,” 
which implies that the absolute is not really absolute, and therefore must be 
relative. So only the relative exists. However, if there is only the relative, then 
that implies that the relative is in fact absolute, and so on. From this paradox, 
Inoue draws the conclusion that the absolute and the relative are inseparable 
and that they share the same substance. Inoue applies similar arguments to a 
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whole set of related distinctions: matter/mind, phenomenon/substance, the 
ideal/matter and mind, sameness/difference. In fact, his philosophy as a 
whole can be characterized as an attempt to overcome distinctions. All the 
poles of these distinctions are said to share the same substance.
However, it is important to note that their differences are not simply dis­
solved; there is difference in sameness. This is explained by the same logic: 
“Sameness (no-distinction, or no-difference, musabetsu is different
from difference (sabetsu Therefore, its substance is difference. Same­
ness is difference, and because the two are both difference, there is no dif­
ference between the two.”24 The conclusion is that difference and sameness 
share the same substance, i.e., “from the no-difference, difference arises.”25
24 Ibid., p. 206.
25 Ibid., p. 205.
26 Ibid., p. 208.
27 Ibid., p. 209.
To return to the original problem, mind and matter are distinct, but share 
the same substance in “the ideal” (risd H?®). Always pedagogical, Inoue com­
pares this to a sheet of paper in order to visualize it:
In the one substance of the ideal there is the difference of matter 
and mind. This is like a sheet of paper with a front and a back. If 
you look at it from the front, matter is the whole or the ideal. If you 
look at it from the back, mind is the whole or the ideal. Apart from 
the front, there is no back, and apart from the back there is no front. 
Therefore mind and matter share the same substance. Apart from 
the front and back, there is no whole, and apart from the whole there 
is no front and back. Therefore the ideal substance is mind and mat­
ter, but the front and the back differ, and therefore there remains a 
distinction between mind and matter.26
Inoue goes one step further and maintains that one half (mind or matter) also 
contains the other half. As each contains the other half (and itself), each con­
tains the whole of the ideal. This is because there is difference in sameness. 
To conclude, this metaphysics has an epistemological consequence: one mind 
(or one piece of matter) is at the same time a small part and the whole of the 
ideal, “Compare it with the eye which is but one part of the universe, yet can 
contain the whole of its phenomena.”27 Therefore we can know the ideal. 
Although we can recognize it as a basic tenet of Tendai Buddhism, this the­
ory, according to Inoue is also found in Hegel’s philosophy. Again following 
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the logic of the latter, the theory of the unity-in-substance of matter and mind 
is the synthesis of materialism and idealism. Showing no small ambition for 
what is of course his own philosophy, Inoue concludes that it is the only 
complete philosophy, and “it unites and harmonizes the theories of old and 
new, East and West.”28
28 Ibid., p. 215.
29 Ibid.,p. 153.
30 Ibid., p. 154.
To recapitulate, this rather unusual account of philosophy is, according to 
Inoue, the way philosophical thought naturally and logically develops from a 
pre-reflexive state to materialism, then to idealism and the synthesis of the 
two. However, this gives the impression of a linear development, but Inoue 
states that philosophy develops in a circular way:
“[In the stage where] intellectual capacities are not yet developed, 
all people believe that mind and matter differ in substance. When 
the intellect moves to its highest stage it gradually comes to under­
stand the principle of the unity-in-substance of matter and mind. If 
we look at it like this, difference-in-substance is the starting-point 
of logical thinking and unity-in-substance must be the final stage. 
However, these two are not entirely different. If one reasons from 
the principle of difference-in-substance and goes one step further, 
one comes to the unity-in-substance. If one reasons from the unity- 
in-substance and goes one step further, one returns to the differ- 
ence-in-substance. This is called the circulation of the ideal (risd 
no junka ITS® This circulation means that logic revolves and
returns to its starting-point.”29
A consequence of this circularity is that it is possible to start at any point on 
the circle, i.e., any of the positions described above, and eventually return to 
the same point. Inoue writes that he chose as the starting-point the position 
of difference-in-substance of matter and mind, “only because it is based on 
our ordinary way of thinking.”30 If we ask for the theoretical basis for this 
theory of circulation, it is found in the last position, the unity-in-substance of 
matter and mind. The ideal itself produces from its own power the whole of 
evolution in matter and mind. When it reaches its culmination, evolution finds 
itself back at the starting-point. This circularity is therefore “not only the law 
of the ideal, it is the law of logic, . . . and it is the law of things.” In other 
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words, the development of thinking and that of the universe share the same 
circularity.
There is a variety of philosophical problems in Inoue’s account. For 
instance, if the development of thinking and that of the universe share the 
same circularity, one might ask what the relation between the two is, but Inoue 
is not explicit on this point. Further, one might ask if the development of phi­
losophy also has a metaphysical meaning. We are reminded of Hegel’s phi­
losophy, in which the history of philosophy is both man’s developing 
understanding of the absolute and, at the same time, the absolute coming to 
understand itself. But Inoue does not make an elaborate comparison between 
his own philosophy and Hegel’s, because he argues that they are the same. In 
short, the status of the internal development is left unclear. In any case, in 
Inoue’s philosophy, z-Ao, the ideal, means three things: ultimate understand­
ing, true reality and the origin of the universe. As in Hegelian philosophy, 
Inoue makes no real distinction between logic and ontology. Another prob­
lem is that Inoue attempts to overcome the conflict between materialism and 
idealism, which necessarily presupposes the existence of a distinction 
between matter and mind. Both materialism and idealism try to reduce one 
pole of the distinction to the other. Inoue tries to overcome this by positing 
an origin that is neither wholly material nor spiritual. But ultimately this ori­
gin is also left vague. He never explains it clearly and mostly describes it using 
paradoxical expressions, such as “neither one, nor two” (fuitsufuni ).
To recapitulate, Inoue’s philosophy of the history of philosophy is a com­
bination of (1) evolutionary theory, (2) Hegelian dialectics, (3) a development 
of thinking on matter/mind, and (4) circularity. Although there are several 
problems with Inoue’s view of Western philosophy and his own theories, the 
primary concern of this paper is the way in which he attempts to harmonize 
Western philosophy and Buddhism. We will now turn to Buddhism, for the 
crux of Inoue’s philosophy is in his application of these principles of the 
development of philosophy to that of Buddhism.
History of Buddhism
The main argument in Bukkyd katsuron honron (The Revival of
Buddhism) is that Buddhism is a religion based on philosophy. This charac­
terization involves a reinterpretation of Buddhist history. As a philosophy, 
Buddhism is subject to the same laws of development that Inoue applies to 
Western philosophy. Therefore, he also distinguishes between the external 
and the internal development of Buddhism.
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(1) External Development of Buddhism
To start with, we can look at the application of evolutionary theory to the 
development of Buddhism, but before looking at how this works concretely, 
we have to pause and realize the novelty of the seemingly banal statement, 
“Buddhism develops.” The traditional Buddhist account of its existence in 
time is found in the theory of mappo (mappo shiso 5ki£SS). This theory 
divides history into three periods: “true law” (shobo IEi£), the “imitative law” 
(zdbd {>?£), and the “latter day of the law” or the “end of the teachings” 
(mappo). In other words, Buddhism is considered to be the most perfect at the 
time of the Buddha and is said to deteriorate gradually, because it is subject 
to its own law of evanescence. Inoue turns this traditional account on its head. 
In modernist fashion, he claims that Buddhism develops and improves, and 
also that it must be developed and improved. For Inoue, this meant a break 
with traditional Buddhist scholarship:
In general, Buddhists believe that Buddhism was most developed 
at the time of the Buddha, and, after that, it has deteriorated until 
today. Their studies are accordingly mere notes on the sutras 
preached by the Buddha, notes on notes and interpretations of 
phrases and sentences. They do not have the perspicacity to ask 
what the spirit behind these phrases is, nor do they make [Bud­
dhism] grow and develop. This is the so-called annotation-study 
and is not one based on development.31
31 Inoue 1990a, p. 213.
According to Inoue, the study of Buddhism has to be concerned with evolu­
tion because Buddhism, like philosophy, is a “living thing.” Like any other 
living thing, it has to adapt itself to its environment. Throughout history, 
Buddhism adapted itself to its socio-cultural environment, which is, for Inoue, 
the reason that Indian, Chinese and Japanese Buddhism are different, but still 
remain Buddhism. He compares it to a plant, developing from a seed which 
contains the stem, branches and flowers in a primordial form. The seed is the 
original preaching of the Buddha, and the branches and flowers are the dif­
ferent sects. Inoue says that his vision of a developing Buddhism is a con­
scious choice of a “Western conception of history.” He argues that, in Eastern 
thinking, the original is thought to be the most perfect, and the gradual growth 
in complexity is considered a deterioration, but in Western thought, the devel­
opment into more complex structures is said to signify progress. In a later
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book, Bukkyo tetsugaku {Buddhist Philosophy), he again contrasts
traditional Buddhist scholarship, which he calls “annotation-study,” and 
study in terms of development:
According to annotation-study, all possible truths of Buddhism 
were already fully explained by Sakyamuni. If one thinks in terms 
of development, then Sakyamuni, as the first, laid the seed of Bud­
dhism. In other words, according to the former the flower had 
already opened, while according to the latter the seed planted by 
the Buddha gradually develops and opens later.32 33
32 Inoue 1990b, p. 114.
33 Inoue 1990a, p. 221.
34 Note that Inoue uses the term “rationalism,” which in the development of philosophy con­
forms to the third stage and not the final one. The “rationalism” here in fact corresponds to the 
last stage, the synthesis of materialism and idealism.
Inoue asserts that the theory of mappo is not completely wrong, but that it is 
one-sided. He states: “The mappd of today will be turned around and will be 
made the shdbd.,,yi
(2) Internal Development of Buddhism
The metaphor of the Buddha’s teachings as a seed brings us to the logical (or 
internal) development of Buddhism. According to Inoue, Buddha first ex­
pounded his entire teaching in the Kegon Tbiri (Avatamsaka) sutra. After that 
he preached other sutras according to a dialectical pattern. Inoue interpreted 
the philosophical development of Buddhism as parallel to that of philosophy, 
as described above. Buddhism also moves from materialism to idealism, and 
the synthesis of the two in “rationalism” (yuiriron ntflim).34 He explains the 
development of Buddhism as the alternation of the concepts “being” (u <) 
and “emptiness” (kii ?S). Being means possessing a definite substance, truly 
existing. Emptiness means the absence of a definite substance, not truly exist­
ing. The synthesis of all theories of being and emptiness is found in the “mid­
dle” (chii T). Inoue argues that these Buddhist concepts correspond to the 
dialectical development of pure philosophy, which is his original Buddhist 
philosophy. He classifies the Buddhist texts in the following order:
1. Kegon-kyd rifthfT (Avatamsaka-sutra), explaining the Middle Way.
2. Agon-gyo HAig (Jgama-s'Mtra), explaining being.
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3. Hddo-kyo (Vaipulya-sutra), explaining parallelism of being and 
emptiness.
4. Hannya-kyd (Prajnapdramitd-sutra), explaining emptiness.
5. Hokke-kyd (Saddharma-pundarika-sutra) andNehan-gyd 
(Mahdparimrvdna-sutra), both explaining the Middle Way.
This classification describes the order in which the Buddha preached the 
various sutras (i.e., the development of the Buddha’s philosophy), but Inoue 
also describes Buddhism as a development of different schools. He states that 
while Buddhism is essentially a religion based on philosophy, there is a dis­
tinction between intellectual and emotional schools. The emotional ones are 
Zen W, Nichiren HU and Jodo $-±. The intellectual ones are Kusha 
Jojitsu Hosso Sffi, Sanron Htw, Kegon and Tendai He states that 
Buddhist philosophy is found in the intellectual schools, which he arranges 
as follows:
1. Kusha: school of being.
2. Jojitsu: school of being, variant of emptiness.
3. Hosso: school of emptiness, variant of being.
4. Sanron: school of emptiness, variant of emptiness.
5. Kegon and Tendai: school of the middle.
Kusha and Jojitsu are labeled Hinayana; Hosso and Sanron are called “pro­
visional Mahayana” (gon dciijo bukkyd If ASIA®); Kegon and Tendai are 
said to be Mahayana proper. The first school, Kusha, teaches that the self is 
empty because everything in reality consists of dharmas (ho f£). Only dhar­
mas have substance and a real existence. Because Kusha is primarily con­
cerned with the substance of matter, Inoue calls it materialism. He admits that 
there are different varieties of materialism in Buddhism, Indian philosophy, 
Greek philosophy and modern philosophy. The materialism of the Kusha 
school is most similar to that which is found in modem science. Inoue com­
pares the theory of dharmas to that of atoms. He also compares the Buddhist 
theory of causality to the law of cause and effect found in modem science. 
They share the same principles, but the difference between Kusha and mod­
em materialism is that the latter denies the existence of mind altogether, while 
in Kusha, mind is one of the elements (aggregates) that constitutes human 
beings. Therefore, Kusha is not materialism in the sense of “matter-only,” it 
contains the dualism of matter and mind. The second school, Jojitsu teaches 
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that not only the self but also the dharmas are empty. But the “emptiness” in 
this instance is said to lack the depth of insight found in later Mahayana 
schools. Therefore Jojitsu is still part of the school of being, but is a variant 
of emptiness.
In his theory of the development of philosophy, Inoue argues that there 
occurs an inward turn between the third and fourth stages of the development 
of Buddhism. The theory of dharmas is unsatisfactory in the same way that 
the theory of atoms is, because it offers no explanation of what matter is or 
how the dharmas come to exist. According to Inoue, in order to overcome this 
problem, one is forced to look inwards, and realize that everything we know 
is a phenomenon of the mind. Thus Buddhism logically develops into ideal­
ism, as expounded by the Hosso school, which teaches that all reality is a 
product of the mind, and that all phenomena are transformations of con­
sciousness-only. The idealism of this school is, according to Inoue, identical 
with the philosophy of Fichte. Inoue calls Hosso the first school of emptiness, 
because it teaches that outside the mind nothing exists. However, since it 
assumes that the mind and the images therein have substantive existence, he 
says it is a variant of being.
According to Inoue, because doubt arises about the substantive being of 
those images of consciousness, one must assert their emptiness. The fourth 
school, Sanron therefore teaches that everything is empty. Accordingly, 
Sanron is said to be the alternative to emptiness in the school of emptiness, 
and leads to the Middle Way (chudo 'hit, or churon 'iAm), the synthesis of 
materialism and idealism. The Middle Way teaches that matter and mind are 
identical in substance, and is the same as the acme of philosophy described 
in Inoue’s Tetsugaku ydryd. Here he uses the Buddhist term, “Suchness” 
(shinnyo M#D), to describe the ultimate or the ideal. Shinnyo is described in 
logical terms as “neither one, nor two” (Jiiitsufuni), and in metaphysical terms 
as “matter and not matter, emptiness and not emptiness, neither matter nor 
emptiness, and both matter and emptiness.”35 This indicates that Inoue’s pre­
sentation of the development of Buddhism is concerned with the same ques­
tions of pure philosophy that he describes in Tetsugaku ydryd: matter and mind.
The dialectic movement of Buddhism can also be described in terms of 
“Objective Theory” (kyakkanron WWw), “Subjective Theory” (shukanron 
and “Theory of the Ideal” (risoron flffitm). Inoue uses the terms, 
“Objective Theory” and “Subjective Theory,” to describe the orientation of
35 This pattern is derived from the fourfold negation or tetralemma in the logic of Nagarjuna, 
the main figure of the Sanron school.
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a given theory. The first means oriented toward matter, or simply the outside 
world, while the second means oriented toward the mind. The most extreme 
form of an objective theory is found in the materialism of Kusha, and the most 
extreme form of a subjective theory is found in the idealism of Hosso. In 
Kusha, Buddhism presents us with explanations in terms of “Objective 
Theory” that conform to Western scientific theory. Hosso presents the argu­
ments that are “Subjective Theories,” and the Middle Way synthesizes the 
two in the “Theory of the Ideal.” However, the crux of the reasoning that leads 
up to the “Theory of the Ideal” is essentially “Subjective Theory,” and the 
idealist argumentation.
Although the acme of philosophy and Buddhism presented in Tetsugaku 
ydryd results in the synthesis of the two, Inoue here qualifies Buddhism as a 
“Subjective Theory,” without much further comment or explanation. He 
argues that the ideal is explained in logical terms (not one, not two; the iden­
tity of relative and absolute), and that it is based on reason, which is a part of 
the mind. He criticizes the theory that only mind exists, but the subjectivist 
argument of Hosso, that everything exists only for the mind, is never actual­
ly denied in his critique. In Bukkyd katsuron honron, Inoue makes a distinc­
tion between “absolute mind” (zettaishin which means Suchness, and
“relative mind” (sotaishin ffl&hL'), which includes matter and what we nor­
mally consider as “mind.” Although for Inoue, the Theory of the Ideal is the 
synthesis of materialism and idealism, the balance is clearly tilted toward ide­
alism. Maybe we can say that Inoue’s Buddhism is a sort of methodological 
idealism, in that the basic method and arguments are idealist, but the conclu­
sion is not that “only mind exists.” The dialectical development of Buddhism 
can be summarized in the following chart:






Hosso Emptiness (being) Idealism




Middle Rationalism Unity-in-substance Theory of the Ideal
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Finally, Buddhism, as a philosophy, has a circular development. To com­
plete the circle, Inoue adds the school of Shingon MIS', which has not been 
described above, because he interprets it to be philosophically the same as 
Tendai and Kegon. Shingon stresses the “interpenetration and non-obstruc- 
tion” of all things, but describes it in an “objectivist” way, which brings us 
back to the starting-point of Kusha. For Inoue, the circular development 
implies that all theories contained in it are in fact equal. From the viewpoint 
of absolute truth there are no different theories, they only exist from the view­
point of man. The starting-point can be any position on the circle. The com­
plete truth becomes apparent only when one moves around the entire circle. 
The theoretical basis for this circular development of Buddhism is found in 
the Theory of the Ideal itself:
Firstly, the truth or the substance of the ideal is equality. It is with­
out discrimination, without beginning or end, earlier or later. It is 
like a uniform circle. If we now use logic to inquire into this, it is 
as if we have to fix a starting-point on the circle. And with one step 
of logical reasoning, the difference between first and last, begin­
ning and end, immediately comes about. Therefore, if we continue 
[to reason] according to logic in the ideal, we should certainly know 
that we will move in the same way as in a circle. This [circle] is 
actually the natural character of the ideal.36
36 Inoue 1990a, p. 291
37 Ibid., pp. 58-59, 176.
In other words, the theory of Buddhist philosophy moves in a circular way 
because reality moves in such a way. Another basis for the argument of this 
circular development is found in the Buddhist conception of time. In the first 
part of Bukkyd katsuron honron, Inoue contrasts the Western (Christian) lin­
ear conception of time with the endless circle of time as taught by Buddhism. 
In contrast to the theory of creation, Buddhism teaches that there is no begin­
ning or end in time, and that time moves in a circle.37
To say that Buddhist theory develops in a circular way means in effect that 
Buddhism itself is subject to its own laws. The Buddhist idea of difference in 
equality is also applied to Buddhism itself. All Buddhist theories stem from 
the same truth, and are in this respect equal. However, at the same time they 
remain distinct, they can also be distinguished in terms of their quality. There­
fore, Inoue can still maintain that Mahayana is more profound than Hmayana. 
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One might ask the question: If all theories are equal and there is only one truth, 
why are there different theories? Inoue explains that because of the difficul­
ty of this one truth, the Buddha preached it in several stages, following the 
logical capacities of humanity. This gives us the logical development of 
Buddhism from materialism to idealism into rationalism. Although Inoue’s 
theory of development is based on philosophical arguments, this philosophi­
cal basis for his argument for circular development is somewhat weak. 
However, the circularity in logic is also found in reality, which means that the 
theory takes itself into account. This gives it a strong universal character, 
which is what Inoue was aiming for.
Inoue constructed a new history for Buddhism, but it is not what we would 
normally expect from a history. It is one of philosophical stages, not one based 
on the research methods of the academic discipline of history. However, 
because present and future are made more important than or at least equally 
as important as the past, it is a “modem” history. The circularity ultimately 
makes all Buddhism and philosophy a phenomenon of the one eternal truth, 
which in a sense de-historicizes both Buddhism and philosophy. At the same 
time, according to Inoue, Buddhism develops in this world, and has in fact 
adjusted to the socio-cultural environment in India, China and Japan. How­
ever, he does not clarify how this circular, internal development and this his­
torical, external development relate to each other.
In order to characterize Inoue as a Buddhist historian, one must consider 
his endeavor in its historical context. The classical Buddhist view of history 
is found in the theory of mappo?* Inoue, as we saw, turned this theory on its 
head. The critical classification of teachings carried out in China (Jpn. kyoso 
hanjaku WHlifWX) is, in a sense, the traditional Buddhist method of historical 
analysis. This analytical process was an attempt to classify Buddhist teach­
ings from superficial to more profound. Inoue typifies his own classification 
as a new kyoso hanjaku?9 His kyoso hanjaku is not entirely new in that it is 
clearly inspired by the Tendai school, and is justified by the classical Buddhist 
notion of updya (hdben ^zffll).38 940 What is new about his classification is that he 
explains it in terms of modern philosophy. In sum, Inoue’s history of 
38 For the question of characterization and study of Buddhist historical consciousness and 
hermeneutics, see Maraldo 1993.
39 Inoue 1990a, p. 224. See also Tachikawa 2000.
40 This interpretation says that the more profound teachings of Mahayana were kept hidden 
because humans were not yet ready to understand them, and therefore the Buddha gradually 
expounded the truth by starting with the more superficial Hinayana.
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Buddhism is a hybrid of classical Buddhist scholars’ kydsd hanjaku, Hegelian 
dialectics and evolutionary theory.
Inoue’s history of Buddhism is situated between traditional Buddhist schol­
arship and modem Buddhology. Classical kydsd hanjaku is historically incor­
rect, because the Mahayana teachings were produced centuries after the 
Buddha’s death, which was the basis of the argument that holds that Mahayana 
Buddhism is not the Buddha’s teachings. In the Meiji era, Buddhology, as a 
Western academic discipline, was introduced to Japan from Europe. The his­
torians, trained in this discipline, were seriously concerned about the appar­
ent historical invalidity of Mahayana Buddhism. Inoue differs from modem 
Buddhologists in that he interprets Buddhism as a modem philosophy, and 
says that therefore he is not interested in questions about exact dates or who 
first preached Mahayana teachings. Inoue argues that Buddhism is to be 
believed for its philosophical value, not for the authority of the one who first 
spoke of it.
III. Conclusion: Changing Buddhism’s Past to Address the Present
Having read this summary of Inoue’s presentation of the development of phi­
losophy and Buddhism, philosophers probably feel some dissatisfaction with 
his argumentation, and Buddhologists might object that he did not know his 
own history very well. His thesis that philosophy and Buddhism share the 
same logical development is forced, and nobody would make the same argu­
ment in academic circles today. Although these are all justified objections, 
Inoue had to work with the tools that he had and face the realities of his time. 
The discipline of philosophy was only just being introduced in Japan, and he 
played a significant role in this process. Buddhology as an academic disci­
pline was also only just in its initial phase. Inoue was not a historian, in the 
strict sense of the word, and therefore should not be evaluated as a historian 
of Buddhism. He was, instead, a new protagonist of Buddhism, who wanted 
to make a new move in Buddhism, just like others before him.
Let us therefore return to the reason behind Inoue’s theorizing: the revival 
of Buddhism in Meiji Japan. We saw that Meiji Buddhism was suffering from 
persecution and faced critiques that challenged its very foundations. For 
Inoue, the reinterpretation of Buddhism’s past was in large part an ideologi­
cal reaction against these three critiques: that Mahayana Buddhism was not 
authentic Buddhism, that Buddhism was not Japanese, and that Buddhism was 
both socially and economically harmful to society.
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The following is a discussion as to how Inoue’s new interpretation of Bud­
dhism’s past can be used against these anti-Buddhist criticisms. In response 
to the first, he applies the evolutionary theory in order to free Japanese 
Buddhism from the critique that it is not Buddhism and to prove that 
Mahayana is its most perfect form. He makes ideological use of the evolu­
tionary theory to frame his argument that Hinayana is only the seed, and that 
Mahayana is the flower. Secondly, the foreignness of Buddhism is countered 
by his idea that it adapted to its environment in India, China and Japan. It 
became naturalized in the Japanese environment. To counter the criticism that 
Buddhism is harmful to society, Inoue argues that philosophy is like the ner­
vous system or the animating spirit of the greater organism of society. 
Buddhism, as Japan’s philosophy, should be kept and nurtured. Further, one 
of the reasons for discontent with Buddhism was the plurality of schools and 
sectarian quarrels. Instead, Inoue interprets this plurality as a sign of devel­
opment. He stresses that Buddhism’s development from a simple seed of the 
original teachings to a complex form with different schools as branches and 
flowers, was progress, in the Western sense of the word. More abstractly, a 
modernist view of history in terms of progress through evolution made 
Buddhism’s present and future more important than its past. Buddhism was 
understood dynamically, in the sense that it could adapt itself to anything and 
still remain the same Buddhism. Therefore, Inoue could maintain that it was 
not an evil of the past, and could adapt to whatever changes were to come in 
the rapidly modernizing Japanese society.
He also uses the logical development of Buddhism to the same ideological 
ends. To interpret it as a philosophy, it was necessary to provide Buddhism 
with a history and an account of its development like those of Western phi­
losophy. The culmination of both in the Theory of the Ideal proves the philo­
sophical validity of Buddhism, which was disputed by anti-Buddhist rhetoric. 
Inoue mentions that Buddhism is in fact the same as the philosophy of Hegel, 
no doubt with the desire in mind to appropriate the authority attached to 
Hegel’s name. Finally, the theoretical characterization of Buddhism as a sub­
jectivism, which according to Inoue is mainly expressed in Mahayana, is also 
one more argument against the theory that “Mahayana is not Buddhism.” 
Although his presentation of the circular development of thought seems some­
what elusive, it may have had a concrete ideological purpose. Granting all the 
stages of Buddhist philosophy the same status on the circle makes all the 
schools equal, which may have been Inoue’s attempt to formulate a theoret­
ical basis for discarding intersectarian quarrels.
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Finally, I wish to add a note on Inoue’s thought as a whole. First of all, the 
extent of his concrete influence on Japanese Buddhism and philosophy has 
not yet been ascertained. Most Japanese studies on Inoue (mainly conducted 
by Tbyo University of which he is the founder) avoids mentioning that his 
name, once so well known, is now forgotten. Also, in Japan, Buddhism does 
not describe itself as “philosophy” any longer. On the other hand, some of 
Inoue’s theories, especially those regarding the external development of 
Buddhism, are found in later Buddhist writers. Secondly, his philosophical 
ambition was not limited to the revival of Buddhism. Studies on Inoue mostly 
emphasize one aspect, and interpret his other activities as a function of that 
aspect: Inoue as a nationalist, Buddhist, or philosopher. However, much like 
Hegel, as a typical thinker of the nineteenth century, he tried to make one all- 
encompassing system of thought. He attempted to include philosophy, reli­
gion, nationalism, science and psychology, into his own version of Buddhist 
philosophy. In order to define Buddhism’s place at the top of all philosophies 
and religions, he had to change its past.
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